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Abstract
As machine learning increasingly affects people and society,
it is important that we strive for a comprehensive and uni-
fied understanding of how and why unwanted consequences
arise. For instance, downstream harms to particular groups
are often blamed on “biased data,” but this concept encom-
pass too many issues to be useful in developing solutions.
In this paper, we provide a framework that partitions sources
of downstream harm in machine learning into five distinct
categories spanning the data generation and machine learn-
ing pipeline. We describe how these issues arise, how they
are relevant to particular applications, and how they moti-
vate different solutions. In doing so, we aim to facilitate the
development of solutions that stem from an understanding
of application-specific populations and data generation pro-
cesses, rather than relying on general claims about what may
or may not be “fair.”
Introduction
Machine learning (ML) is increasingly used to make deci-
sions that affect people’s lives. Typically, ML algorithms op-
erate by learning patterns in historical data and generalizing
them to unseen data. As a result, problems with the data or
development process can lead to different unintended down-
stream consequences. In recent years, we have seen several
such examples, in contexts from predictive policing (Lum
and Isaac 2016) to face recognition (Phillips et al. 2011).
Common rhetoric is that various unwanted consequences
of ML algorithms arise in some way from “biased data.” In
this context, the term “bias” refers to an unintended or poten-
tially harmful property of the data. Data, however, is a prod-
uct of many factors, from the historical context in which it
was generated to the particular forms of measurement error
it contains. And it is not just the data that causes problems.
The ML pipeline involves a series of choices and practices,
from evaluation methodology to model definition, that can
lead to unwanted effects. As an ML practitioner working on
a new application, it is still not straightforward to identify
what problems may be present. Even once identified, it is
not clear what the appropriate application- and data-specific
solution should be, or how this solution generalizes over fac-
tors such as time and geography.
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Take the following toy scenario: an engineer building a
smile-detection system observes that the system has a higher
false negative rate for women. Over the next week, she col-
lects many more images of women, so that the proportions
of men and women are now equal, and is happy to see
the performance on the female subset improve. Meanwhile,
her co-worker has a dataset of job candidates and human-
assigned ratings, and wants to build an algorithm for pre-
dicting the suitability of a candidate. He notices that women
are much less likely to be predicted as suitable candidates
than men. Inspired by his colleague’s success, he collects
many more samples of women, but is dismayed to see that
his model’s behavior does not change. Why did this hap-
pen? The sources of the disparate performance in either case
were different: In the first case, it arose because of a lack of
data on women, and introducing more data solved the issue.
In the second case, the use of a proxy label (human assess-
ment of quality) versus the true label (actual qualification)
allowed the model to discriminate by gender, and collecting
more labelled data from the same distribution did not help.
The contribution of this paper is a new framework and
language for partitioning sources of downstream harm into
five distinct categories. In doing so, we:
1. Provide a consolidated and comprehensive terminology
for effectively understanding and connecting work in ML
fairness, unpacking broad and/or overloaded terms (e.g.
“training data bias”).
2. Illustrate that particular solutions make implicit but im-
portant assumptions about the data and domain that
should be made explicit. We envision future papers being
able to state the problem(s) they address in clear, shared
terminology, making their framing and assumptions im-
mediately understandable.
3. Facilitate solutions that stem from an understanding of the
data generation and analysis processes of a particular ap-
plication, as opposed to solutions that stem from global
assumptions about what it means to be fair.
We note that the categories we define are not mutually ex-
clusive; in fact any one application could suffer from any
combination of them. Identifying and characterizing each
one as distinct, however, makes them less confusing and eas-
ier to tackle.
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(a) Data Generation
(b) Model Building and Implementation
Figure 1: (a) The data generation process begins with data collection from the world. This process involves both sampling from a population
and identifying which features and labels to use. This dataset is split into training and evaluation sets, which are used to develop and evaluate
a particular model. Data is also collected (perhaps by a different process) into benchmark datasets. (b) Benchmark data is used to evaluate,
compare, and motivate the development of better models. A final model then generates its output, which has some real world manifestation.
This process is naturally cyclic, and decisions influenced by models affect the world that exists the next time data is collected or decisions are
applied. In red, we indicate where in this pipeline different sources of downstream harm can arise.
A Broad View
In this work, we identify issues that commonly arise in ML
applications that lead to some unwanted or societally unfa-
vorable outcome (discussed in more detail below in Societal
Harms). We argue that analyzing consequences of a partic-
ular algorithm should begin with a thorough understanding
of the data generation and ML pipeline that led to its output.
The sources of harm we consider arise at different points
in such a pipeline (see Figure 1). Historical bias is a norma-
tive concern with the world as it is; it is a fundamental, struc-
tural issue with the first step of the data generation process
and can exist even given perfect sampling and feature se-
lection. Representation bias arises when defining and sam-
pling from a population, and measurement bias arises when
subsequently choosing and measuring the particular fea-
tures of interest. Evaluation bias occurs during model iter-
ation and evaluation. Aggregation bias arises when flawed
assumptions about the population affect model definition.
Each of these is described in detail later in the paper.
Knowledge of an application can and should inform the
identification of bias sources. Issues that arise in image
recognition, for example, are often related to selection or
evaluation bias. Images themselves tend to be objective,
but they may not equally represent the entire space of im-
ages that we care about. In data that is affected by hu-
man decision-makers, we often see human decisions used
as proxies, introducing measurement bias. For example, “ar-
rested” is used as a proxy for “crime,” or “pain medication
prescribed by doctor” is used as a proxy for “patient’s pain.”
Identifying aggregation bias usually requires some under-
standing of meaningful groups and reason to think they are
distributed differently. Medical applications, for example,
often risk aggregation bias because patients with similar un-
derlying conditions present and progress in different ways.
Recognizing historical bias requires a retrospective under-
standing of the application and data generation process over
time.
Background
Societal Harms
Barocas et al. (2017) describe a useful framework for think-
ing about how the negative consequences of automated sys-
tems actually manifest, splitting them into allocative and
representational harms. Allocative harms occur when op-
portunities or resources are withheld from certain groups,
while representational harms occur when a system dimin-
ishes a particular identity. Consider a search engine that dis-
proportionately displays ads about criminal records when
African American names are searched (Sweeney 2013). If
this then leads to racial discrimination against loan appli-
cants, that would be an allocative harm. Even if it does not,
however, the perpetuation of racial stereotypes is still a rep-
resentational harm.
Fairness Definitions and Mitigations
Formalizing Fairness Many works have gone on to for-
malize mathematical notions used to measure some of these
harms. Typically, these are framed around problems of clas-
sification and decision-making, and so address allocative
harms. Broadly, they describe some criterion that should
be met in order for the algorithm to be considered “fair.”
They fall into several categories, many of which presuppose
a “sensitive attribute” on which examples can be split into
groups of interest:
• Group-Independent Predictions (Zemel et al. 2013;
Feldman et al. 2015; Corbett-Davies et al. 2018) require
that the decisions that are made are independent (or condi-
tionally independent) of group membership. For example,
the demographic parity criterion requires that predictions
are uncorrelated with the sensitive attribute.
• Equal Metrics Across Groups (Chouldechova 2017;
Corbett-Davies et al. 2017) require equal prediction met-
rics of some sort (this could be accuracy, true positive
rates, false positive rates, and so on) across groups. For
example, the equality of opportunity criterion requires
equal true positive rates across groups (Hardt et al. 2016).
• Individual Fairness (Johndrow and Lum 2017; Yona and
Rothblum 2018) requires that individuals who are similar
with respect to the prediction task are treated similarly.
The implicit assumption is that there exists an ideal fea-
ture space in which to compute similarity, that is reflected
or recoverable in the available data. For example, fairness
through awareness tries to identify a task-specific similar-
ity metric in which individuals who are close according to
this metric are also close in outcome space (Dwork et al.
2012).
• Causal Fairness (Kilbertus et al. 2017; Nabi and Shpitser
2018) definitions place some requirement on the causal
graph that generated the data and outcome. For example,
counterfactual fairness requires that there is not a causal
pathway from a sensitive attribute to the outcome decision
(Kusner et al. 2017).
Interested readers are referred to Narayanan (2018) or
Verma and Rubin (2018) for a more detailed discussion of
different fairness definitions.
Fair Algorithms Techniques to design “fair” algorithms
typically identify a fairness notion of interest and modify
the modeling pipeline to satisfy it. Methodologically, they
fall broadly into:
• Data-based methods, such as data reweighting, e.g., up-
weighting examples that align with a particular fairness
objective (Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer 2013; Kamiran,
Zˇliobaite˙, and Calders 2013; Kamiran and Calders 2012;
Calders, Kamiran, and Pechenizkiy 2009).
• Model-based methods, such as the addition of regulariza-
tion terms or constraints that enforce a particular fairness
objective during optimization, or representation learning
to “mask” out a sensitive variable (Zafar et al. 2017;
Zemel et al. 2013; Luong, Ruggieri, and Turini 2011;
Berk et al. 2017).
• Post-hoc methods, such as identifying different decision
thresholds for different groups based on a predicted score,
e.g., in order to equalize false positive rates (Hardt et al.
2016; Corbett-Davies and Goel 2018).
For more analysis, Friedler et al. (2019) compare several
mitigation techniques on a number of benchmark datasets.
Most existing fairness definitions and algorithms make
the implicit assumption that an underlying procedural or sta-
tistical notion of fairness can be mathematically defined and
operationalized to create a fair system. This assumption of-
ten does not address domain-specific societal and historical
contexts (Green and Hu 2018). As a result, because appli-
cations are so different, these methods have limited scope.
For instance, while ensuring group-independent predictions
might make sense in hiring (when it is illegal to factor gen-
der or ethnicity into decisions), it would not be appropriate
in a medical application where gender and race can play an
important role in understanding a patient’s symptoms. The
framework we provide is inherently application-specific be-
cause it stems from identifying the sources of harm through-
out the full data generation and ML pipeline.
Related Work
Several works have presented overviews of issues that arise
in real datasets. Some of these have been through the lens
of a particular domain: Barocas and Selbst (2016) examine
various problems that arise in a data-mining pipeline through
the lens of American anti-discrimination law, and Danks and
London (2017) present a taxonomy of “algorithmic bias,”
focusing on its manifestation in autonomous systems. This
work was extended by Silva and Kenney (2018) to address
racial bias in decision-making more generally, though cate-
gories in their taxonomy such as “training data bias” encom-
pass many distinct subproblems. Others have focused on a
particular subset of the ML pipeline: Calders and Zˇliobaite˙
(2013) go over assumptions that are commonly made in the
modeling process, and problems that arise because of in-
correct labels, skewed sampling procedures, or incomplete
data. Friedler, Scheidegger, and Venkatasubramanian (2016)
also discuss assumptions about populations that underlie so-
lutions, focusing on how the measured data relates to the
desired data.
Our work provides a more comprehensive and unified
view on how these issues arise. We aim to provide a shared
framework that can encompass many applications while fa-
cilitating task-specific social analysis and targeted mitiga-
tion.
Five Sources of Bias in ML
Historical Bias
Historical bias arises even if the data is perfectly measured
and sampled, if the world as it is leads a model to produce
outcomes that are not wanted. For instance, even if we had
access to the perfectly-measured feature “crime” in the pre-
vious example, it might still reflect historical factors that
have led to more crime in poorer neighborhoods. Such a sys-
tem, even if it reflects the world accurately, can still inflict
harm on a population. Considerations of historical bias tend
to involve evaluating the representational harm (such as re-
inforcing a stereotype) to a particular identity group.
Example: image search In 2018, 5% of Fortune 500
CEOs were women (Zarya 2018). Should image search re-
sults for “CEO” reflect that number? Ultimately, a variety of
stakeholders, including affected members of society, should
evaluate the particular harms that this result could cause
and make a judgment. This decision may be at odds with
the available data even if that data is a perfect reflection of
the world. Indeed, Google has recently changed their Image
Search results for “CEO” to display a higher proportion of
women.
Representation Bias
Representation bias occurs when the certain parts of the in-
put space are underrepresented. A supervised machine learn-
ing algorithm aims to learn a function f that minimizes
E(x,y)∼Pˆ [J(f(x), y)], where Pˆ is a probability distribution
over the input space and J is a loss function, e.g., 0-1 loss
for binary classification. If D(Pˆ ||P ) ≥ 0 where D is a mea-
sure of divergence and P is the true data distribution (i.e.,
Pˆ is not equal to the true data distribution), this is selection
bias in the traditional statistical sense.
Representation bias arises if Pˆ is a distribution that sam-
ples too few examples from a particular part of the input
space. When we lack data about some part of the input space,
the learned mapping f will be more uncertain for new x, y
pairs in that area. It is worth noting that even ifD(Pˆ ||P ) = 0
(i.e., no selection bias), representation bias can still occur: if
some group is a minority that only makes up 5% of the true
distribution, then even sampling from the true data distribu-
tion will likely lead to a significantly less robust model for
this group.
Representation bias can arise for several reasons, includ-
ing:
1. The sampling methods only reach a portion of the pop-
ulation. For example, datasets collected through smart-
phone apps can under-represent lower-income or older
groups, who are less likely to own smartphones. Similarly,
medical data for a particular condition may only be avail-
able for the population of patients who were considered
serious enough to bring in for further screening.
2. The population of interest has changed or is distinct
from the population used during model training. Data
that is representative of Boston, for example, may not be
representative if used to analyze the population of Indi-
anapolis. Similarly, data representative of Boston 30 years
ago will likely not reflect today’s population.
Example: geographic diversity in image datasets Im-
ageNet is a widely-used image dataset consisting of 1.2
million labeled images (Deng et al. 2009). Approximately
45% of the images in ImageNet were taken in the United
States, and the majority of the remaining images are from
North America or Western Europe. 1% and 2.1% of the im-
ages come from China or India, respectively. Shankar et al.
(2017) show that the performance of a classifier trained on
ImageNet is significantly worse for several categories (such
as “bridegroom”) on images that are crowdsourced from
under-represented countries such as Pakistan or India versus
images from North America and Western Europe.
Measurement Bias
Available, measured data are often proxies for some ideal
features and labels. For example, arrest rates are often used
as a proxy for crime rates. If the measurement process just
adds random noise, the model parameters will converge to
the those we would expect with the correctly measured fea-
tures (given enough data). On the other hand, measurement
bias often arises because proxies are generated differently
across groups (also known as differential measurement er-
ror (VanderWeele and Hern’an 2012)).
Measurement bias can arise in several ways:
1. The granularity of data varies across groups. For ex-
ample, if a group of factory workers is more stringently or
frequently monitored, more errors will be observed in that
group. This can also lead to a feedback loop wherein the
group is subject to further monitoring because of the ap-
parent higher rate of mistakes (Barocas and Selbst 2016;
Ensign et al. 2017).
2. The quality of data varies across groups. Structural dis-
crimination can lead to systematically higher error rates in
a certain group. For example, women are more likely to be
misdiagnosed or not diagnosed for conditions where self-
reported pain is a symptom (in this case “diagnosed with
condition X” is a biased proxy for “has condition X”).
3. The defined classification task is an oversimplification.
In order to build a supervised ML model, some label to
predict must be chosen. Reducing a decision to a sin-
gle attribute can create a biased proxy label because it
only captures a particular aspect of what we really want
to measure. Consider the prediction problem of deciding
whether a student will be successful (e.g., in a college ad-
missions context). Fully capturing the outcome of ‘suc-
cessful student’ in terms of a single measurable attribute
is impossible because of its complexity. In cases such as
these, algorithm designers resort to some available label
such as ‘GPA’ (Kleinberg et al. 2018), which ignores dif-
ferent indicators of success exhibited by parts of the pop-
ulation.
Example: predictive policing As mentioned previously,
in predictive policing applications, the proxy variable “ar-
rest” is often used to measure “crime” or some underlying
notion of “riskiness.” Because minority communities are of-
ten more highly policed and have higher arrest rates, there
is a different mapping from crime to arrest for people from
these communities. Prior arrests and friend/family arrests
were two of many differentially mismeasured proxy vari-
ables used in the recidivism risk prediction tool COMPAS
(Angwin et al. 2016), and was a factor that eventually led to
higher false positive rates for black versus white defendants.
It’s worth noting that even such an evaluation is complicated
by the proxy label “rearrest” used to measure “recidivism”
(Dressel and Farid 2018).
Aggregation Bias
Aggregation bias arises when a one-size-fit-all model is used
for groups with different conditional distributions, p(Y |X).
Underlying aggregation bias is an assumption that the map-
ping from inputs to labels is consistent across groups. In re-
ality, this is often not the case. Group membership can be
indicative of different backgrounds, cultures or norms, and
a given variable can mean something quite different for a
person in a different group.
Aggregation bias can lead to a model that is not optimal
for any group, or a model that is fit to the dominant pop-
ulation (if combined with representation bias). If there is a
non-linear relationship between group membership and out-
come, for example, any single linear classifier will have to
sacrifice performance on one or both groups. In some cases,
incorporating information about group differences into the
design of a model can lead to simpler learned functions
that improve performance across groups (Dwork et al. 2017;
Suresh, Gong, and Guttag 2018).
Example: clinical-aid tools Diabetes patients have
known differences in associated complications across
ethnicities (Spanakis and Golden 2013). Studies have also
suggested that HbA1c levels (widely used to diagnose and
monitor diabetes) differ in complex ways across ethnicities
and genders (Herman and Cohen 2012). Because these
factors have different meanings and importances within
different subpopulations, a single model is unlikely to be
best-suited for any group in the population even if they are
equally represented in the training data.
Evaluation Bias
Evaluation bias occurs when the evaluation and/or bench-
mark data for an algorithm doesn’t represent the target
population. A model is optimized on its training data, but
its quality is often measured on benchmarks (e.g., UCI
datasets (Huang et al. 2007), Faces in the Wild (Dheeru and
Karra Taniskidou 2017), ImageNet (Deng et al. 2009)), so
a misrepresentative benchmark encourages the development
of models that only perform well on a subset of the popula-
tion.
Evaluation bias ultimately arises because of a need to ob-
jectively compare models against each other. Applying dif-
ferent models to some set of external datasets attempts to
serve this purpose, but is often extended to make general
statements about how good a model is. Such generalizations
are often not statistically valid (Salzberg 1997), and can lead
to overfitting to a particular benchmark or set of bench-
marks. This is especially problematic if the benchmark is not
representative. This process is self-fulfilling, as Hand (2006)
points out: “Indeed, the more successful the collection is in
the sense that more and more people use it for comparative
assessments, the more serious this problem [overfitting to
particular benchmarks] will become.”
Evaluation bias can be exacerbated by the particular met-
rics that are used to report performance (both on a model’s
own test data and on external benchmarks). For example,
aggregate measures can hide subgroup underperformance
(Suresh, Gong, and Guttag 2018), but such metrics are often
used because a single measure makes it straightforward and
quick to compare models and make a judgment on which
one is “better.” Just looking at a single type of metric (e.g.,
accuracy) can also hide disparities in other types of errors
(e.g., false positive rate).
Example: underperformance of commercial facial recog-
nition algorithms Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) point
out the drastically worse performance of commercially-used
facial analysis algorithms (performing tasks such as gender-
or smiling- detection) on dark-skinned females. Looking at
some common facial analysis benchmark datasets, it be-
comes apparent why such algorithms were considered ap-
propriate for use – just 7.4% and 4.4% of the images in
benchmark datasets such as Adience and IJB-A are of dark-
skinned female faces. Algorithms that underperform on this
slice of the population therefore suffer quite little in their
evaluation performance on these benchmarks. The algo-
rithms’ underperformance was likely due to representation
bias in the training data, but the benchmarks failed to dis-
cover and penalize this. Since this study, other algorithms
have been benchmarked on more balanced face datasets,
changing the development process to encourage models
that perform well across groups (Ryu, Adam, and Mitchell
2018).
Formalizations and Mitigations
Figure 2: A data generation and ML pipeline viewed as a series of
mapping functions. The upper part of the diagram deals with data
collection and model building, while the bottom half describes the
evaluation process. See the text for a detailed walk-through.
The implications of identifying a particular type of bias
are highlighted by abstracting the ML pipeline to a series of
data transformations. Consider the data transformations for
a particular dataset (Figure 2). Let X and Y be the ideal,
underlying features and labels we wish to capture. The sub-
script indicates the size of the populations, so XN indicates
the entire population and Xn indicates the smaller popula-
tion that is actually used, where s : XN → Xn is the sam-
pling function. Xˆ and Yˆ are the measured and available fea-
tures and labels that are chosen to build a model, where r
and t are the projections from X → Xˆ and Y → Yˆ that
result in this data. The function f : X → Y is what we want
to learn, but g : Xˆ → Yˆ is the actual function that is learned.
This data transformation sequence can be abstracted into a
general process D. Then, k computes some measurement of
successM for g on data Xˆ ′, Yˆ ′ that can come from the same
pipeline or a different one (D′ in Figure 2).
Measurement and historical biases are issues with how
features and labels are projected, i.e., how r and t are instan-
tiated. Therefore, we can see that solutions that try to adjust
s (e.g., collecting more data that then undergoes the same
transformation to Xˆ) will likely be ineffective. Representa-
tion bias stems from a problem with s, the sampling func-
tion; methods that then adjust r or t (e.g., choosing different
features or labels) or g (e.g., changing the objective function)
may be misguided. Importantly, solutions that do address
representation bias by adjusting s implicitly assume that r
and t are acceptable (e.g., they are something close to the
identity function) and therefore, improving s will mitigate
the issue. Benchmark and aggregation bias are discussed in
more detail in the case studies below.
Case Study 1: Mitigating Aggregation Bias
Aggregation bias is a limitation on the learned function
g (e.g., a linear parameterization) that stems from an as-
sumption about the homogeneity of p(Yˆ |Xˆ). Ultimately,
this results in a g that is disproportionately worse for some
group(s). Addressing limitations of g can be achieved by ei-
ther 1. adjusting g to better model the data complexities, or
2. transforming the data such that g is now better suited to it.
Methods that adjust g include coupled learning meth-
ods, such as multitask learning, that parameterize differ-
ent groups differently in the model definition and facilitate
learning multiple simpler functions that take into account
group differences (Dwork et al. 2017; Suresh, Gong, and
Guttag 2018; Oneto et al. 2018).
To transform the data, we need to change r or t. Fair rep-
resentation learning involves projecting data into a space
(i.e., coming up with a new mapping r : X → Xˆ) where
examples that are similar with respect to the prediction task
are close to each other in feature space (i.e., projecting into
a space where p(Yˆ |Xˆ) is the same across groups), and then
learning g (Zemel et al. 2013; Louizos et al. 2015). This
space aims to capture some true underlying features that may
manifest differently across groups. Note that solutions such
as anti-classification (Corbett-Davies et al. 2018) or fair-
ness through unawareness (Gajane and Pechenizkiy 2017)
that make predictions independently of group membership
do not address aggregation bias.
Case Study 2: Mitigating Evaluation Bias
Evaluation bias is an issue with M , a measurement of the
quality of the learned function, g. If we trace the inputs to
M , we can see that addressing M would involve 1) redefin-
ing k (i.e., the function that computes evaluation metrics)
and/or 2) adjusting Xˆ , Yˆ (data and labels from a separate
benchmark dataset).
Improving k involves making it more comprehensive and
granular. The granularity of k can be improved with sub-
group evaluation that compares per-group metrics as well
as aggregate measures that weight groups equally (Buo-
lamwini and Gebru 2018). Deciding what groups to use is
often application-specific and requires intersectional analy-
sis and privacy consideration; see Mitchell et al. (2018) for a
more in-depth discussion. Multiple metrics and confidence
intervals improve the comprehensiveness of the evaluation.
Choosing the metrics of interest should involve domain spe-
cialists and affected populations that understand the usage
and consequences of the model. In a predictive policing ap-
plication, for example, law enforcement may prioritize a low
false negative rate (not missing any high-risk people) while
affected communities may value a low false positive rate
(not being mistakenly classified as high-risk). Section 4.4
of Mitchell et al. (2018) further discusses different metrics.
Issues with Xˆ ′ and Yˆ ′ stem from an unrepresentative sam-
pling function s′. Improving s′ may involve targeted data
augmentation (e.g., SMOTE) to populate parts of the data
distribution that are underrepresented (Iosifidis and Ntoutsi
2018; Chawla et al. 2002).
Conclusions
We provide a framework for understanding “bias” in ML
at a level of abstraction that we hope will facilitate produc-
tive communication and development of solutions. Terms
such as “training data bias” are too broad to be useful, and
context-specific fixes don’t have the shared terminology to
generalize and communicate the problem to a wider audi-
ence. We envision future work being able to state upfront
which particular type of bias they are addressing, making it
immediately clear what problem they are trying to solve and
making assumptions explicit rather than implicit.
By framing sources of downstream harm through the data
generation process, we encourage application-appropriate
solutions rather than relying on broad notions of what is
fair. Fairness is not one-size-fits-all; knowledge of an appli-
cation and engagement with its stakeholders should inform
the identification of these sources.
Finally, we illustrate that there are important choices be-
ing made throughout the larger data generation and ML
pipeline that extend far beyond model building. In practice,
ML is an iterative process with a long and complicated feed-
back loop. We highlight problems that manifest through this
loop, from historical context to the process of evaluating
models and benchmarking them against each other.
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